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Transporting the European Social Partnership Model to 
Australia   
  
By Paul J. Gollan and Glenn Patmore1 
 
Abstract 
 
There has been a long tradition of debate over workplace democracy in Australia. Yet, 
workplace democracy remains one of the great unfulfilled promises of Australian labour law. 
While the current focus on enterprise bargaining in the workplace might encourage us to 
think about new information and consultation mechanisms at work, there are no legislative 
provisions imminent. We argue that the voluntary approach of recent Australian governments 
has failed to create a generally available right to consultation at work. In this article we 
therefore consider how information and consultation procedures could be introduced into 
Australia, drawing upon the European social partnership model and the Australian 
experience with employee consultation mechanisms.  In particular, the paper assesses 
employee consultation procedures in light of good workplace relations practices, examines 
how the Workplace Relations Act could be amended to incorporate a new model, and 
assesses its likely effectiveness in the current Australian industrial relations context. 
 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming publication in the Journal of Industrial Relations. Paul J. Gollan is an Associate Fellow in the 
Department of Industrial Relations at the London School of Economics, email p.j.gollan@lse.ac.uk. Glenn 
Patmore is a Senior Lecturer at The Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, 
g.patmore@law.unimelb.edu.au. The authors would like to thank Mr Ben Ferguson, Mr Samuel Koehne  and 
Ms Joyce Chia for their invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article. Very special thanks must 
also be given to Ms Shelley Marshall who read a draft of this paper and Ms Anna Chapman who read an extract 
of the paper.  The authors thank them for their very thoughtful comments. All errors are the authors’ own. 
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Introduction  
 
There has been a long tradition of debate over workplace democracy in Australia. Its 
continual, phoenix-like re-emergence over the last 30 years in government and academic 
literature testifies to the power of the idea and its capacity to capture the collective 
imagination. Equally, its fading from the political agenda is strong evidence of the tenacity 
and vitality of those powerful forces that stand against it. In our view, workplace democracy 
remains one of the great unfulfilled promises of Australian labour law.  
 
The terms ‘workplace democracy’ and ‘employee participation’ are often used 
synonymously. When we use these terms, we mean the rights and entitlements of employees 
to influence decisions affecting their working lives. From this perspective, there are a variety 
of legal forms of employee participation mechanisms in existence in Australia today. These 
include collective bargaining over wages and conditions, the existence of occupational health 
and safety schemes under State legislation,2 and several limited legislative and contractual 
consultative entitlements relating to redundancy.3 Unlike citizens in many other Western 
democracies, under Commonwealth law Australians do not have a general right to be 
consulted and informed in their workplaces (Combet, 2001). 
  
This article is based on a consideration of the absence of such rights in the Australian context. 
As a means of promoting employee representation, the article focuses on a new framework 
for employee information and consultation. (See also Gollan, 2002; Gollan, Markey and 
Ross, 2001; Patmore, 1999; Patmore, 2001). We look to recent developments in Europe, 
which are underpinned by a model of ‘social partnership’ and how such a model could be 
incorporated in Australian labour law. The significance of the social partnership model is that 
it moves beyond a very narrow conception of the employment relationship as a function of 
the labour market, towards a consideration of work in a broad social context. Under this 
model, employees and employers possess important social rights and responsibilities. Most 
importantly, some of these social rights have been enshrined in European law.4  
                                                 
2 See for instance, Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW).  
3 See for instance, Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA), Part VIA, Division 3, Subdivisions D and E. 
4 While many authors have considered the prospects of adoption in Australia of European Works Councils, this 
article is distinctive because of its exploration of the European social partnership model as a basis for 
introducing new information and consultation procedures in Australia. Our focus on the European social 
partnership model means that not all aspects of the introduction of works councils into Australia will be 
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Our article explores how the European social partnership model might be transported to 
Australia and provides an introduction within this context.  The article is informed by the 
social, political and economic context and is therefore interdisciplinary, drawing upon the 
disciplines of labour law and industrial relations. Our purpose is to outline the potential 
possibilities and limitations of the social partnership approach in the Australian industrial 
relations context, rather than focus on an examination of the legal technicalities or the 
compliance mechanisms required under the European Directives. 
 
As a means to achieve this, we first briefly review the European social partnership model. 
Europe has a long history of utilising employee consultation mechanisms and in this section 
we explore the principles and procedures of two notable Directives from the European 
Council relating to employee participation, the European Works Council Directive (EWCD) 
and National Directive establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees within member states (NDIC). 
 
In the second part of the paper, we review the Australian experience of employee 
representation. We assess judicial and tribunal decisions in Australia that have supported the 
development of schemes of workplace democracy. We also look at recent federal government 
approaches towards the provision of employee consultation and information.  
 
Thirdly, we outline some of the challenges in implementing a social partnership model of 
employee consultation in the Australian context. In this part we outline the kind of social 
partnership arrangements that might be adopted, possible amendments to the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WRA) and the likely success of such a legislative model in the 
Australian context. Finally we draw some conclusions from the preceding review. 
 
The European Social Partnership Model 
 
Experience in Europe suggests that the social partnership model has been a particularly 
effective means of incorporating employee democracy into law. By social partnership we 
mean the role that ‘social dialogue’ plays in both developing and maintaining statutory forms 
                                                                                                                                                        
discussed. The paper also makes a contribution to the literature in that it labels the model explaining its 
operation drawing upon EU directives and accompanying explanatory documents.  
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of employee participation. According to the social partnership model, participants in a 
business enterprise have both an economic and a social function.  In Europe, the term ‘social 
partner’ refers to various actors such as government, employers, employees and union 
representatives (Flynn, 1999).  Accordingly, the European Commission consults with key 
social partners prior to issuing European Union Directives5, which are forms of law that 
apply to all member states. To illustrate the operation of EU Directives, brief references will 
also be made to relevant instances where the UK has implemented regulations.  
 
The social partnership model is well illustrated by the European Works Councils Directive 
(EWCD, 1994 & 1997; The Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 1999 (TI&CE Regs 1999) which was issued by the European Parliament in the 
mid to late 1990s. Works Councils (EWCs) have been prevalent in Europe for many years 
and are typically a committee of employees that is consulted by management over important 
workplace decisions.  The Directive applies to large transnational enterprises, with at least 
1000 EU employees, and two businesses of at least 150 people in different Member States 
(EWC, 1997: art. 2(1)(a)).   
 
The foundations for the social partnership model can be found in the aims of the EWCD. 
Some of its key aims are: 
 
• to foster and improve workers’ fundamental social rights to information, consultation 
and participation; and  
• to promote dialogue between management and labour to harmonise concentrations, 
cross-border mergers, takeovers and joint ventures directed towards the 
transnationalisation of undertakings (EWCD, 1994: Explanatory Memorandum, 
recitals, art. 1(1)). 
 
Clearly, these objectives are simultaneously social, economic and cultural, and they address 
some problems particular to the process of European integration. In essence, the 
implementation of the EWCD has created a new form of social partnership. The Directive 
adopted a two-stage approach (Barnard, 1999: 15) to creating partnerships at work. The first 
stage encourages voluntary negotiations to satisfy the Directive (EWCD, 1994: art. 5; 
                                                 
5 Agreement on Social Policy attached to the Protocol (No 14) on Social Policy annexed to the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
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Barnard, 1999: 15) either by allowing existing EWCs to continue to operate, creating new 
EWCs, or fashioning alternative arrangements for satisfying the Directive’s requirements 
(EWCD, 1994: arts 6, 12–13; Bellace, 1997: 351). By April 1999, almost 600 corporations 
which are potentially covered by the law had established EWCs by means of company 
agreements, covering one-third of all undertakings (and about 40 per cent of employees) 
(Conference on the Practical Application of the European Works Council Directive, 1999).  
There has been a steady increase in the numbers of EWCs in recent years. By November 
2002, some 750 EWCs were in existence (EWC, 2002: art 3).  
  
The second stage imposed mandatory requirements on companies to comply with the 
Directive. Where no agreement can be reached between employers and employees, 
‘subsidiary’ provisions apply (EWCD, 1994: art. 7; Barnard, 1999: 15). Although these 
mandatory default provisions are fairly modest (Barnard, 1999: 15), it is significant because 
they require the establishment of a designated model of a works council.  
 
The subsidiary provisions (contained in the annex) prescribe a way forward, as well as a 
structure for EWCs. EWCs comprise a committee of between three and thirty employees. As 
a means to satisfy the social objectives of the Directive, the committee is required to consult 
with management about major issues affecting their company, including: 
 
• the ‘structure, economic and financial situation’ of the company; 
• the ‘probable development of the business’; and 
• the ‘situation and probable trend of employment’, mergers, cut-backs and closures of 
undertakings, and collective redundancies (EWC, 1994; EWCD, 1994: annex 2).  
 
 The mandatory requirements also create a legal mandate for workplace democracy which 
could be applied to the Australian context. However, different features of the EWCD both 
raise doubts and reinforce its democratising effect. EWCs can be composed either of elected 
or appointed representatives (EWCD, 1994: Annex). In failing to guarantee that EWCs have a 
clear democratic mandate, the Directive potentially limits its legitimacy and efficacy. 
Without elections, the EWCs legitimacy is derived from its legal mandate in conjunction with 
its partnership role and the appointment of employees. Importantly, the legitimacy of staff 
representatives may be enhanced if they are union members - unions being the traditional 
9 
representatives of employees.  To ensure employees have an input in the workplace, the 
Directive protects security of tenure, guarantees their pay and deals with the withholding of 
information by central management (EWCD, 1994: art. 10). Nonetheless, the EWCD protects 
confidential information (EWCD, 1994: art. 8). While this restriction is important in 
maintaining a competitive position for undertakings, potentially it may restrict information 
and consultation between employees and their Works Council representatives. Lastly, both 
the EWC and management are under an obligation to work in a spirit of cooperation (EWC, 
1994; EWCD, 1994: art. 9). This cooperative spirit is regarded as critical to creating a climate 
of trust, a fundamental pre-requisite for developing and maintaining partnership at work.  
 
While unions are recognised as social partners in the EWC framework, their role is not 
explicitly defined by the Directive. Rather the EWCD leaves several important matters to be 
stipulated by national legislation (Muller-Jentsch, 1995). These matters include: 
 
• whether representatives are elected or appointed; 
• the EWCs’ ‘ability to engage in industrial action’; 
• the EWCs’ ‘ability to engage in wage bargaining, and the form of protection of wages 
and conditions of employees’ representatives’; and 
• the minimum requirements of employer ‘consultation with EWCs and the remedies 
available if employers fail to consult adequately with EWCs’ (Bellace, 1997: 357; 
EWCD, 1994: art. 9).  
 
These matters have been left to national governments so that EWCs can be integrated into 
individual national systems of industrial relations.  This is because, under European Law, the 
national government is authorised to regulate the conduct of unions and employers within 
their own industrial relations framework (Collins, 2003: 7–8).  
 
In addition to the EWC initiatives, features of social partnership can also be found in another 
EU Directive, the NDIC.  This Directive establishes a general framework for improving 
participation rights of employees in large nationally-based enterprises. The directive was 
proposed in November 1998 and was adopted and came into force in March 2002 (Directive 
No.2002/14/EC). The UK government responded promptly to the new Directive, issuing 
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regulations which came into effect on 6 April 2005 (The Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 2004 (I&CER)).  
 
Potentially, this Directive is more far reaching than the earlier EWC Directive, covering a 
broader range of issues and establishing a more thorough legally-based consultation process 
(Gospel and Willman, 2003). This Directive will eventually apply to all undertakings or 
businesses with more than 50 employees in all member states (NDIC, 2002: art 3(1)(a) & 
(b)).6 Notably, it is estimated that the NDIC could cover about 60 per cent of employees 
within the EU (Burns, 2000). In the UK, it is estimated that three quarters of the entire labour 
force could be covered after full implementation of the Directive in five years (Gospel and 
Willman, 2003).  
 
The Directive’s foundation in the social partnership philosophy is evident in the preamble to 
the NDIC.7 Some key aims mentioned in the preamble are (NDIC, 2002): 
• to promote social dialogue between management and labour;  
• to strengthen dialogue and promote mutual trust within undertakings; 
• to increase employee availability to undertake measures and activities to increase their 
employability, promote employee involvement in the operation of  the future of the 
undertaking and increase its competitiveness; and   
• to ensure that all citizens benefit from economic development  
 
Clearly, the purposes of the NDIC are both economic and social. The list of topics to be 
discussed by employers and employees are: 
• the future development of the enterprise’s activities and its economic situation (NDIC, 
2002: art 4(2)(a)) 
• employment, particularly where there is a threat to employment within the business 
(NDIC, 2002: art 4(2)(b)), and    
                                                 
6 As part of the agreement with the UK, the Directive is being introduced in phases: firms with more than 150 
employees have until 6 April 2005 to set up information and consultation procedures; firms with more than 100 
employees have until 6 April  2007; and those firms with more than 50 employees will be included under the 
Directive from 6 April 2008. 
7 The preamble is a statement which promotes the general policy of the introduction of information and 
consultation procedures in every large national business throughout Europe.  
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• issues likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or contractual 
relations, especially issues directly affecting job security such as collective 
redundancies and business transfers (NDIC, 2002: art 4(2)(c)).  
 
The topics of firm performance, continuance of employment and job security have both 
economic and social implications. Given the scope of the preamble, new topics not yet 
included may be added to the list, such as training, the development of human capital and 
equal opportunities (Collins, 2003a). 
 
The new Directive allows for flexible partnership arrangements.  Much like the earlier EWCD 
for large enterprises, the Directive permits employers and employees to negotiate 
implementation procedures for information and consultation (NDIC, 2002: art. 5). If no 
agreement can be reached within a required period of time, then an employer must adopt the 
statutorily mandated information and consultation committee, which is in effect a works 
council.  (I&CER: r. 18(1)(b)).  However, the employer and the committee have the 
flexibility to change the structure at a later date (I&CER: r. 18(2)). Unlike the EWCD, the 
Directive does not therefore mandate the establishment of a Works Council, but leaves open 
the kinds of arrangements that might be implemented or altered.  
 
Remedies are available where an employer fails to establish information and consultation 
procedures and to settle disputes about their operation. The NDIC states that sanctions for 
failing to comply with the obligations contained in the Directive should be ‘effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive’ (NDIC, 2002: art. 8(2)). In the UK, the regulations state that 
failure to comply will incur a fine of up to £75,000 (I&CER: rr. 21(2), 32(2), (4). See 
generally, I&CER: Part IV). 
   
The NDIC provisions regarding employee and employer protection mirror those of the 
EWCD, raising similar issues of strengthening and weakening the democratic functions of 
representatives.  Accordingly, employees’ representatives have adequate ‘protection and 
guarantees’ to enable them to perform their duties including pay, tenure and time off (NDIC, 
2002: art 7). The NDIC protects confidential information (NDIC, 2002: art 6). The Directive 
imposes an obligation of co-operation on those arranging or implementing a negotiated 
agreement or when implementing the standard procedures (NDIC, 2002: art 1(3)). It could be 
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similarly argued that such an obligation is a prerequisite to the establishment of mutual trust 
and obligations. 
 
Significantly, the NDIC leaves it up to member states to decide the role for trade unions 
within the social partnership framework, with trade unions having a central role in many 
European countries and a less important role in the UK. Furthermore, the UK regulations are 
not linked to collective bargaining, nor is trade union involvement mandated by the scheme 
(Collins, 2003a).   
 
While the EWCD focuses on the harmonisation of transnational arrangements within the 
internal European market, the NDIC focuses on the challenges presented by changing 
employment arrangements and the competitive pressures of globalisation. The philosophy 
underpinning the NDIC is to move organisations into a new approach based on high skill, 
trust, quality and performance and the involvement of employees in workplace decision 
making, thus necessitating new thinking and practice8. The significance of this social 
partnership model for managers in the UK, is that they must engage in a new form of 
dialogue with employees and/or trade unions. 
 
These EU initiatives are meant to complement other policies of the European Commission 
including moving to lifelong learning; adaptation of social legislation and of tax systems 
based on a normal working life; new means of remuneration; working time; and equal 
opportunities (European Commission, 1998).  
 
It can be concluded that overall the European Commission’s aim is to forge the social 
partnership agenda and develop a framework for the modernisation of the organisation of 
work. As the European Commission has suggested, this modernisation could be achieved 
through the creation and support for joint understanding, through joint declarations, or 
through binding legal initiatives (European Commission, 1998)9.  
                                                 
8 It could be argued that high skill produces the capacity and capability for individuals and organisations, trust 
provides the means and process to access that capacity, and quality and performance are its outcomes 
underpinned by greater employee involvement in the decision-making arrangements (Gollan, 2005). 
9 Importantly, speaking after the adoption of the NDIC proposal, the then Employment and Social Affairs 
Commissioner, Pádraig Flynn, stated: “This is an important day for social Europe, as, after a long phase of 
preparation and consultation, we are presenting an important tool in the search for greater adaptability in the 
workforce. The Commission’s proposal provides a framework within which the Member States and the social 
partners can ensure an effective and balanced involvement of workers in a more positive and flexible approach 
to reorganisation and change, especially the modernisation of work organisation.”  
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The Australian Experience  
 
EU employee information and consultation and national legislation which has been enacted in 
many European countries (Gardner and Palmer, 1997: 344) has not been matched in 
Australian national or State legislation. Yet, some participatory decision-making processes 
have been recognised in court and tribunal decisions in our industrial relations system. We 
now review the approach of the courts and tribunals to the development of participatory 
decision-making processes, as well as assessing recent federal government policies in relation 
to legislative reforms incorporating improved employee consultation and information.  
 
Court and tribunal decisions and employee participation 
 
Some participatory decision-making processes have existed in Australia’s industrial relations 
system, fostered by court and tribunal decisions. These schemes of employee participation 
represent the antecedent for the development of a possible partnership model, although their 
emergence was subject to constitutional and legal challenges to their validity.  
 
Constitutional validity 
 
The creation of the consultation and information schemes by the federal parliament is subject 
to the Australian Constitution. The Australian Constitution provides that the federal 
parliament can only  make  laws  with respect  to  a  list of particular subject matters,  or what 
is sometimes referred to as ‘head of  power’. If a Commonwealth law does not fall within a 
head of power the High Court must hold that the law is invalid, which means it is rendered 
inoperative. 
 
The Parliament does not possess a single head of power that would enable it to legislate 
generally on the subject of industrial relations. However, two key grants of power have been 
relied upon by the federal parliament to create schemes of employee participation: namely, 
                                                                                                                                                        
(European Commission, 1998). 
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the labour power and the corporations power10.  
 
The federal corporations power in section 51(xx)  of  the Australian Constitution permits the 
Parliament to  pass laws  with  respect to 'foreign, trading  or  financial corporations   formed  
within   the   limits  of the Commonwealth'. The corporations power was relied upon by the 
Keating Government to introduce non-unionised Enterprise Flexibility Agreements (EFAs) 
requiring an employee committee to facilitate and consult over the establishment of such 
agreements as well as to introduce workplace consultative committees (Mitchell, Naugthon 
and Sorenson, 1997: 203–4)  a development discussed later in this article. The corporation’s 
power also sustained the shift to enterprise bargaining, and could provide a basis for 
establishing European-style information and consultation schemes in Australia.  
 
This expansive view of the corporations power is supported by the majority judgement of the 
High Court in Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case). Their Honours 
seem to have accepted that the federal parliament can regulate the employment conditions of 
a corporation named in section 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution. Regulation of 
employment conditions is broad enough to include the creation of employee consultative 
committees in incorporated companies, which could provide a necessary forum for employee 
democracy to flourish. 
The federal labour power provides another head of power to enact laws for the 
democratisation of work - one that has been more extensively relied upon than the 
corporations power. The federal labour power in section 51(xxxv) of the Australian 
Constitution permits the federal parliament to make laws with respect to the settlement and 
prevention of industrial disputes. It has been claimed that the federal labour power would not 
cover employee consultation, because consultation of employees is not a proper subject of an 
industrial dispute.  Rather, it is argued that it is entirely a matter for management to determine 
(Creighton and Stewart, 2000: 77–8). 
 
In Re Cram the High Court comprehensively rejected this view, maintaining that the 
                                                 
10   In this article we have only discussed those powers which have been relied upon by the federal Parliament to 
create schemes of employee participation. There are other potential  powers that  could  be  relied  upon, 
including  the taxation power, the trade  and  commerce power,  and  the territories’ power or powers in other 
state jurisdictions. (For a comprehensive study of how these powers might be used to support schemes of 
employee participation see McCallum and Patmore, 2002). 
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managerial prerogative:  
 
[p]robably echoes  in some respects what was received doctrine  at an  earlier  
time  -  that it was  the  prerogative  of management  to decide how a business 
enterprise  should operate   and  whom  it  should  employ,  without the workforce  
having  any  stake in  the  making  of  such decisions ... Over the years that 
climate of  opinion has changed  quite radically  ...  No  doubt  our traditional  
system  of  industrial  conciliation   and arbitration  has  itself  contributed  to a 
growing recognition  that management and labour have  a  mutual interest in 
many aspects of the operation of a business enterprise. (Re Cram: 125) 
 
The High Court reinforced this view by broadly defining the meaning of an ‘industrial 
matter’. This included management decisions that directly affect the employment 
relationship, for instance, levels of employment and modes of recruitment. It is hard to see 
any future High Court retreating from this evolutionary and commonsense interpretation of 
the labour power. The significance of this case is that it puts beyond doubt the fact that the 
award system established under the labour power may be relied upon by a federal parliament 
to introduce schemes of employee participation. We have reached the stage where employee 
participation schemes can validly be enacted under the labour or corporations powers. It is 
one thing to recognise the broad scope of the federal parliament’s powers; another equally 
important consideration is an assessment of the development of legally mandated employee 
participation schemes in Australia. 
The conciliation and arbitration system11  
The initial vehicle for establishing the democratisation of work in Australia has been the 
centralised tribunal-based systems of compulsory State and federal conciliation and 
arbitration, which were established in order to settle industrial disputes. Throughout last 
century, these systems regulated much of the conduct of the participants in Australia's 
industrial relations. These systems still exist at the federal level and in all States of 
Australia12. Respective federal and State Acts of Parliament provide for the establishment of 
                                                 
11 This section draws partially from an Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training 
(ACIRRT) working paper by Gollan, P., Markey, R. and Ross, I. (2001) ‘Additional forms of employee 
representation in Australia’, Working Paper 64, University of Sydney. 
12 In Victoria, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) exercises limited arbitral powers with 
respect to most Victorian employees: see Part XV of the WRA. The Independent Report of the Victorian 
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industrial tribunals, the registration and legal recognition of employer and employee 
associations (unions13), and detail the rights and obligations of the parties subject to some 
legislative limitations. The tribunals are empowered to handle industrial disputes and to set 
wages and conditions of employment embodied in awards.14   
 
Historically, employer and employee associations together with the industrial tribunals have 
dominated the wage-setting and dispute-resolution processes. Employees have only been able 
to access this system through being represented by trade unions.  However, in recent years 
union density and award coverage has declined dramatically.15 The traditional relationship 
between employer and employee associations has been and continues to be more as 
adversaries, in conflict with each other, than as partners co-operating together in making 
submissions to industrial tribunals. 
 
Furthermore, until the 1980s, tribunals - supported by the courts - traditionally treated 
managerial prerogative as sacrosanct in areas outside a narrow perception of ‘industrial 
issues’ (essentially wages and hours).  Issues such as technological and organisational change 
and issues associated with it, training, and the structure of the workforce, all of which would 
be the subject of consultation (and even co-determination) in European works councils, were 
thus effectively excluded from the jurisdiction of the Australian industrial relations system 
until the mid-1980s (Markey, 1987).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Industrial Relations Taskforce recommends the reestablishment of a limited form of State IR Tribunal for 
Victorian employees. See Part XV of the WRA which provides for the Federal Commission  to provide 
conciliation and arbitration in Victoria. 
13 In Australia the legal regulation of trade unions is essential to arbitration and conciliation and confers 
corporate status protection against discrimination, and security and protection against competing unions 
covering the same industry or occupation. The AIRC needs to be satisfied that ‘the association is free from 
control by or improper influence from, an employer, or an association or organisation of employers’ (WRA s 189 
(aa)). 
14 An award is an order that is the product of a settlement of a dispute by an industrial tribunal made under the 
federal labour power. In some cases awards "apply to whole industries across the entire continent, in others they 
apply only to part of an industry in a particular State or region, or even to specific enterprises." (Creighton and 
Stewart, 2000: 122). 
15 It is estimated that Australian trade union membership has declined to around 24 per cent of the workforce by 
2002, a decline in union membership from 45 per cent in 1986 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002: 6310.0 
Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, Australia). According to ACIRRT 42 per cent of 
the workforce is covered by registered collective agreements and an additional 44 per cent of the workforce 
covered by awards and over-award arrangements (including unregistered agreements). About half of this group 
are covered by an award only. In addition, 14% of workers are covered by individual arrangements (only about 
1.7% of the workforce is covered by Australian Workplace Agreements) (ACIRRT, 2003: 
http://www.acirrt.com/research/default.htm). 
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The legal framework of workplace consultation  
Commission Decisions  
 
During the 1980s, two dramatic changes occurred in the Australian system.  Firstly, tribunals 
(supported by the High Court) broadened the scope of issues considered to be suitable for 
consultation (Markey, 1987). These tribunals also spelt out in quite some detail the methods 
for participation in workplace decision making. They have also endeavoured over time to 
give practical guidance on the conduct of workplace consultation.   
The Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (now the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC)) initially created an entitlement to employee participation in 
response to the Australian Council of Trade Union’s (ACTU) 1984 Termination, Change and 
Redundancy Test Case (TCR Case 1984) and the judgment in the following year (TCR Case 
1985). The ACTU sought improvements in employee job security by establishing obligations 
on employers to, amongst other things, consult with employees and provide information 
about changes to work methods (TCR Case 1984: 37), the introduction of new technology 
(TCR Case 1984: 35) and proposed redundancies (TCR Case 1984: 37; see also Appendix B, 
TCR Case 1984) 
Responding to the ACTU's claim, the Commission inserted provisions into awards requiring 
employers ‘to consult with employees and their representatives as soon as a firm decision had 
been taken about major changes in production, program, organisation, structure or technology 
which are likely to have a significant effect on employees’. Employers had to provide in 
writing 'relevant' information (TCR Case 1984: 52) including an explanation of the nature of 
the proposed changes and their expected effect on employees. But employers were not 
required to disclose confidential information. (TCR Case 1984: 53)   
 
In addition, the Commission inserted a provision requiring an employer to notify and consult 
with employees or their union representatives where it had decided to make employees 
redundant.  (TCR Case 1984: 64)   The Commission adopted a broad and flexible definition 
of redundancy (TCR Case 1984: 61-62). It required employers to provide 'relevant' 
information in writing including “the reasons for the proposed terminations, the number and 
categories of employees likely to be affected, the number of workers normally employed and 
the period over which the terminations are likely to be carried out” (TCR Case 1984: 64). 
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Employers were not required to “disclose confidential information the disclosure of which 
would be inimical to its interests” (TCR Case 1984: 64). 
 
The Commission observed that procedures ‘for notification, consultation and information 
have generally been settled by agreement and negotiation’ and was of the view that such 
matters generally do ‘not lend themselves to effective legislation or award prescription’. 
Nonetheless, the Commission decided to include an award provision requiring employers to 
consult with employees regarding organisational change (TCR Case 1984: 52) and 
redundancies (TCR Case 1984: 64). While the Commission did not explicitly justify the 
inclusion of a provision dealing with organisational change, it did provide the rationale for 
inclusion of a consultation provision in relation to redundancy. The Commission said: “it is 
of fundamental importance to involve employees and their representatives in the problems of 
redundancy as soon as a firm decision has been taken that retrenchments may be necessary.”  
Presumably this was to ensure that the interests of employees are taken into account when 
decisions are made (TCR Case 1984: 63).  
 
Several comments in the judgment are significant, because they explore the limits of legal 
regulation and effective workplace participation. These provisions were seen as effective 
because they created basic procedures for information and notice, and simply tried to bring 
the parties concerned together in order to discuss the manner in which organisational change 
and redundancies might be managed (TCR Case 1984: 54).   
 
Some perceived limits to the reach of this form of legal regulation were also expressed in the 
case. It was argued that the procedures were not intended to direct an employer as to what 
they should decide, but was meant to inform employees and to allow them to discuss major 
changes. Rather, consultation on matters such as job requirements, training, job security, 
working hours, monitoring of changes and the problems of redundancy were intended to 
minimise the potential for conflict which exists when such changes are introduced. Reduction 
of industrial disputes not only provides a practical rationale for consultative procedures. It 
also opens up the possibility for developing a form of partnership relationship, and fulfils the 
constitutional requirement that the Commission must endeavour to prevent or settle industrial 
disputes under the labour power of the Australian Constitution (TCR Case 1984: 51-3). The 
TCR Case 1984 & 85 established rights for employee notice and information, significantly 
contributing to the necessary conditions for employee participation. However, it is critical to 
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realise that it did not provide a forum or structure by which the consultation would take place 
(Combet, 2001). 
The AIRC’s consideration of the subject of consultation changed from examination of 
technological change and redundancy to the promotion of efficiency and productivity in 
Australian workplaces in the 1980s. This was accompanied by a second shift in the 80s, the 
decentralisation of the industrial relations system which emerged under the Commission’s 
wage fixing principles. As part of this process, the AIRC required enterprises to establish 
appropriate mechanisms for consultation and negotiation on matters affecting the 
organisation’s efficiency and productivity, when it adopted the ‘structural efficiency 
principle’ relating to award restructuring in 1988 (Dabscheck, 1995: 30-33, 51-63). The 
leading decision was the 1991 Wage Fixing Principles (National Wage Case 1991), which 
made wage increases subject to awards requiring enterprises to establish a consultative 
mechanism with their employees on matters affecting efficiency and productivity (National 
Wage Case 1991: 48)16. Significantly, this time the Commission combined the topics of 
discussion with a forum for negotiations. 
 
The Commission saw consultative forums as desirable, because they provided a mechanism 
to focus the attention of the parties on structural changes at the workplace level (National 
Wage Case 1991: 49). Furthermore, the forum was intended to provide an ‘educative process’ 
for management and unions on how to negotiate at the workplace. The topics to be discussed 
were meant to provide benefits for both employers and employees. The principles were 
intended to create measures to meet the competitive requirements of industry and measures to 
provide workers with more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs (National Wage Case 1991: 
64). The Commission's decision was effective in that subsequently many awards ‘contained 
provision for consultative committees or some other form of consultative mechanism’ 
(Combet, 2001). The spread of joint consultative committees (JCCs) in Australian firms dates 
from this time.   
 
Most importantly, by introducing these new consultative mechanisms the Commission tried 
to promote a co-operative model involving government, unions, employers, and tribunals. 
However, the decision of the Commission was highly contentious. This was because it 
                                                 
16 The wage fixing function of the Commission consists of considering an application to vary the rates of pay set 
out in a number of key awards to ensure a "fair and reasonable" or "basic" wage (Creighton and Stewart, 2000: 
41-2).  
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introduced these consultative mechanisms as an alternative to the proposal advanced by the 
ACTU and the Federal Government that the Commission introduce a new system of wage 
increases based on enterprise bargaining. The Commission's suggestions that the parties were 
not sufficiently 'mature' nor competent to negotiate at workplace level were not appreciated. 
The government responded by introducing legislation which began the shift to wage increases 
being determined by enterprise bargaining rather than through the award system (Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth)). The reform process carried out by both the Labor and Liberal 
governments gradually diminished the Commission's power to provide for national wage 
increases. Ironically, while the Commission in the 1991 case laid the foundation for co-
operative, possibly partnership-type relationships at the workplace, it undermined a co-
operative partnership-type relationship between itself and the ACTU and the government. 
 
The legislative context - recent federal government 
approaches  
 
Australian governments have typically adopted a voluntarist approach to workplace 
democracy and employee consultation and participation. They have left matters about 
employee information and consultation to be dealt with by employers and employees, 
preferring not to invoke any form of legislative mandate (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 
1997: 197).  The notable exception to this rule came from the Keating Government in 1994 
when it introduced some fairly modest legislative provisions relating to information and 
consultation. We will now move to assess the approach of the Hawke, Keating and Howard 
Governments in this area. 
 
The Hawke Government through the Accord process created a corporatist model of 
partnership. Although the initial Accord did not mention the word partnership, it did create an 
agreement between two political actors, the ACTU and the Labor party opposition. The 
Accord provided an agreement for consultation with employees (via their representatives) on 
a vast range of matters, including prices and incomes. The partnership idea was reinforced by 
the Hawke Government’s conception of industrial democracy as encompassing participation 
by employees and their representatives at the national, industry and enterprise levels 
(Department of Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR), 1986: 23).  
 
While the idea of partnership at the workplace level was never really implemented, the 
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possibility of developing industrial democracy and employee participation was considered by 
the Hawke Government. In 1984, the DEIR held a conference on Industrial Democracy.  The 
result was a policy discussion paper: Industrial Democracy and Employee Participation 
(DEIR, 1986; Davis and Lansbury, 1999). The purpose of the paper was to explore how 
democracy could be extended from Parliament to the workplace. Although there was 
recognition of the democratising effect and the ‘social justice and equity’ (DEIR, 1986: 34) 
aspects of workplace participation, the discussion remained underdeveloped. Expanded 
consideration could have been given to the way in which employee participation in decision-
making can affect not only a person’s economic status, but might also contribute to their 
personal development, enhance civic culture, or broaden social dialogue. Instead, the paper 
provided a blueprint for reform which emphasised the economic benefits of employee 
participation. The paper was premised on three fundamental principles: 
 
• Industrial democracy, achieved through greater participation by employees and their 
representatives, is a desirable objective; 
• Widespread participation will not occur spontaneously; and  
• No single or simple model should be imposed [through legislation].’ (DEIR, 1986: 11, 
158).  
 
The discussion paper was favourably disposed towards potential legislation that outlined 
basic rights and principles for information and consultation of employees, but left it to 
organisations themselves to create appropriate practices (DEIR, 1986: 11-2,158; Davis and 
Lansbury, 1999: 5). As Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen explain, in the final analysis the 
Hawke Government preferred  to ‘seek the views of all interested parties in an endeavour to 
find the most appropriate ways of developing practices, or building on practices that were 
already underway, at the local level’ (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 199). The 
result was that implementation of industrial democracy and employee participation was put 
on the back burner of the government’s agenda. 
 
 In the early 1990s, the issue of employee involvement surfaced again with the shift of 
Australia’s industrial relations system to enterprise bargaining.  This form of bargaining 
necessitated consultative arrangements in the enterprise bargaining process itself. For 
instance, the need to protect employees required that they be consulted about the terms of an 
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agreement before it was approved or certified (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 203-
4). Underlying the government’s approach was a commitment to consultation as a means of 
providing sustainable economic reform. (Cook,1992: 2518; Brown, 1992: 3794). The 
Government promoted enterprise bargaining that encouraged ‘an effective partnership at 
work and a highly skilled, adaptable and committed workforce’ (Sherry, 1993: 3580).   
 
Nationally, new consultation requirements were introduced in 1993 as part of the 
Commonwealth Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (the Reform Act). In particular, the 
provisions relating to non-union agreements or ‘EFAs’ stated that for an agreement to be 
approved it was necessary that during the negotiations ‘reasonable steps’ had been taken to 
‘consult’ and ‘inform’ employees about the agreement and its terms. In addition, these terms 
needed to be ‘explained’ and employees ‘advised’ before the agreement was approved 
(Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 203).  
 
During this period the Keating Government enacted provisions establishing a mechanism for 
employee consultation and information that went beyond the terms of the enterprise 
bargaining process itself. Sections 170MC(1)(d) and 170NC(1)(f) of the Reform Act, made it 
a precondition for certification or approval that an agreement establish ‘a process for the 
parties to the agreement to consult each other about matters involving changes to the 
organisation or performance of work in any place of work to which the agreement relates’ 
unless ‘the parties have agreed that it is not appropriate for an agreement to provide’ such a 
process. 
  
These provisions created a legislative direction to the parties to establish a broader scheme of 
ongoing consultation about workplace changes.  However, this direction had several 
problems. The provisions were vague and failed to give any guidance on the frequency or 
make-up of this ‘process’ (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 204). In addition, these 
provisions did not prescribe the means (structure or processes) through which such 
consultation was to occur (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 203). Importantly, the 
Reform Act only required the establishment of a ‘process’ rather than a ‘mechanism’ or 
‘structure’, and therefore did not necessarily envisage a permanent representative body. Nor 
did the legislation state how employees were to be represented in this process.  
 
23 
It has been argued that this broader requirement was overlooked by the AIRC and by the vast 
majority of employers (Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 208, 215-6). Despite these 
deficiencies, it has also been argued that the increase in indirect forms of employee 
participation in Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (AWIRS) from 1990-
1995 has undoubtedly resulted from directives by industrial tribunals or legislative 
requirements related to enterprise bargaining. This is a positive sign, and suggests that 
legislatively mandated schemes can have an impact. However, in 1995 only a third of 
companies had joint consultative committees (Morehead, et. al, 1997: 193) and by European 
standards, this proportion is quite low. 
 
In 1993, the Keating government introduced a further partnership initiative enacting 
provisions for consultation of employee representatives in relation to redundancies. These are 
now part of the WRA.  The purpose of this amendment was to introduce a national scheme of 
entitlements with respect to redundancies and to strengthen the powers of the AIRC to protect 
workers’ rights (Pragnell and Ronfeldt, 1994; Crichton & Stewart, 2000: 311-312). Workers 
were therefore given new consultation rights where an employer proposes redundancies 
(WRA Subdivision D) or where a decision has been made to make workers redundant (WRA 
Subdivision E).  
 
Subdivision D (WRA ss 170FA–170FE) gives effect to Articles 12 and 13 of the Termination 
of Employment Convention. Under this division, the Commission has the power to make an 
order in relation to an employer’s information and consultation obligations where it proposes 
redundancies. A termination that fails to comply with such an order is unlawful (WRA 
s 170CN). 
 
Under Subdivision E (WRA ss 170GA–170GD), the Commission has power to make orders 
where an employer has decided to terminate 15 or more employees for economic or structural 
reasons and the Commission thinks that there has been inadequate consultation of  the 
relevant trade union (WRA ss 170GA –170GB). In particular, the legislation explains that 
inadequate consultation means that an employer has failed, as soon as practicable, to do either 
of two things: 
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(1) inform the trade union about the reasons for the terminations, the number and 
category of employees likely to be affected and the period over which the 
terminations will be carried out (WRA s 170GA(1)(a)); or 
(2) give the trade union an opportunity to consult with the employer about measures to 
avert, minimise or mitigate the proposed terminations (WRA s 170GA(1)(b)).   
 
In  more recent years the Commission has clarified these obligations (WRA ss 170FA & 
170GA), explaining that:  
• Consultation must take place when an in-principle decision is reached, and certainly 
before candidates for redundancy are identified (CPSU v Vodafone PR911257 
(Vodafone): [28]; CPSU v Optus PR 912122 (Optus): [57]);  
• Consultation once candidates have been selected is too late to allow effective 
contributions to the decision-making process, e.g. identifying relevant criteria and 
allowing for the possibility of voluntary redundancies (WRA s 170GA(1); (Vodafone): 
[28]);  
• Consultation is not “perfunctory advice on what is about to happen”  Vodafone: [25]; 
FSU v Commonwealth Bank PR921470 (Commonwealth Bank 2): 402);   
• Consultation requires an informed decision (Vodafone: [25]; Optus: [38]; 
Commonwealth Bank 2: 402); and 
• The process of consultation is not joint decision-making, nor is it a restriction on 
managerial prerogative (Vodafone: [25]; Optus: [52]; Commonwealth Bank 2: 402). 
 
Where an employer fails to meet the statutory obligations, the AIRC has very considerable 
remedial powers.17 (FSU v Commonwealth Bank PR921049 (Commonwealth  Bank 1): [22]). 
It can prohibit an employer from making employees redundant, require an employer to 
provide relevant information, and possibly issue a reinstatement order. (See Vodaphone: [13]; 
Optus: [63-66]; Commonwealth Bank 2: 402).18 
 
Nevertheless it is important to recognise that the powers of the AIRC are still quite limited.  
The Commission can only exercise its powers upon the application of either an employee or a 
representative of a trade union under subdivisions D (WRA s 170FB) or E (WRA s 170GB).  
                                                 
17 The AIRC may make whatever order it thinks appropriate, subject to public interest considerations, to put the 
employees or their unions in the same position as if there had been proper information and consultation (WRA s 
170GA(2)). 
18 See ALHMWU v Rydges Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 50 AILR 4-471 (77). 
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As Forsyth has pointed out, “the provisions do not really impose positive obligations on 
employers at all, but rather provide a mechanism whereby their failure to consult might be 
rectified ‘after the event’” (Forsyth, 2002: 182) Vodafone: [7] ). Also, orders cannot be 
granted if an alternative remedy exists (WRA ss 170FC  & 170GC).   
 
While the Keating government’s initiative certainly created a national scheme of  redundancy 
entitlements, it is a scheme that only provides weak protection for most employees who are  
facing redundancies.  Yet the Keating government’s experiments with new forms of   
employee consultation has proved to be more pro-active than has hitherto occurred under the  
current Howard government.  
 
The Howard Government was elected in 1996, and while it retained the very limited 
legislative consultative provisions in relation to redundancies (WRA Subdivisions D and E), 
the broader legislative provisions introduced by the Keating Government (Reform Act ss 
170MC(1)(d) and 170NC(1)(f)) were removed. The Coalition Government opposes 
enforcement of employee participation by legislation (The Coalition Industrial Relations 
Policy, 1996). As Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen explain:  
 
[t]he government considered that these ‘complex consultation provisions’ were 
unnecessary because of the general requirement that certified agreements under 
the WRA would be required to be genuinely endorsed by a majority of 
employees at the workplace. The final position reached in the enactment of the 
legislation did not demand the same level of consultation and information 
sharing, or the establishment of a consultation process in the agreement itself 
(Mitchell, Naughton and Sorensen, 1997: 198). 
 
Moreover, early in the Howard Government’s first term it introduced a process which 
removed the consultation obligations in relation to organisational change inserted into 
awards.  It embarked on a dramatic process of award simplification, limiting the number of 
award items to 20 allowable matters (WRA s 89A (1) – (3)). The consultation provisions in 
awards were deleted because they were not regarded as one of the ‘allowable matters’ (Re 
Award Simplification Provision, 1997; Crichton & Stewart: 334). 
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However, this was not the end of the matter. As we mentioned in our introduction, the terrain 
of employee consultation is a contested one and is ongoing. In 2004 the AIRC found a new 
way to re-insert consultation provisions over redundancies into awards (Redundancy Test 
Case 2004). The commission accepted that the list of allowable award matters (in particular 
WRA s 89A(2)(p) “dispute settling procedures”) could include a redundancy dispute 
procedure.  The provision in the Redundancy Test Case 2004 is different from the TCR 
decision in that it only applies to redundancies and not to technological change, but it was 
largely similar to the redundancy consultation provision in the TCR Test Case 1984. 
  
It is significant that all of the industrial parties (the (Australian Council of Trade Unions), 
employer organisations and the government) agreed upon the redundancy dispute clause 
(Redundancy Test Case 2004; 224). This case suggests once a consultation procedure is 
introduced into the Australian industrial relations system, it may become widely accepted by 
all industrial parties. Quite positively, the case also demonstrates how information and 
consultation procedures - once introduced - may become accepted processes of contemporary 
Australian industrial relations.  It is therefore timely that we consider how information and 
consultation processes could be improved and expanded in Australia. 
 
Implementing a social partnership model of employee 
consultation in Australia 
 
We now turn to consider how the social partnership model of employee consultation might 
operate in Australia. We first assess Australian information and consultation procedures in 
terms of good work practices and briefly describe the operation of the new proposed 
partnership arrangements. For these partnership arrangements to be introduced in Australia 
we argue that it will be necessary to amend the WRA. After outlining how the Act may be 
amended, we consider the likely success of such a model. We pay particular attention to how 
we can develop a coherent model that is technically feasible and practically possible in the 
Australian industrial relations system. 
 
Good Practice  
We now identify the kind of legislative criteria that promote good information and 
consultation practices. These are a synthesis drawn from the preceding argument, the 
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historical development of partnership arrangements in Australia as well as the European 
experience. The EWCD and NDIC provide the minimum standards of good work practices for 
European companies. Legislative criteria for establishing good information and consultation 
procedures have also been tried and tested by courts and tribunals in Australia. Assessing the 
Australian approach against our proposed criteria below, we find it wanting. We argue for the 
development of a new legislative model and briefly sketch how it might affect work practices 
in Australia.  
 
From the Australian experience, the following features can be identified:  
• Relevant but not confidential information should be provided in writing to employee 
representatives ; 
• Information should be provided when a firm decision is taken;   
• Consultation should take place at an early stage in order to allow bona fide 
discussions; 
• Consultation is providing employees with a bona fide opportunity to influence the 
decision maker; 
• Consultation does not involve joint decision-making or interference with 
management's ultimate decision-making prerogative; 
• There should be a forum or structure where the consultation would take place  
• Topics for discussion should be specified; and 
• Representative consultation should not be required in small organisations. 
 
From the European experience, the following additional features can also be identified: 
• There should be a statement of the economic and social purposes of the law;  
• The composition of the committee should be specified;  
• Representatives’ security of tenure should be protected;  
• The frequency of meetings should be specified; and 
• The powers of the committee should be clearly described.  
 
Our proposed features provide guidance for the drafting of a legislative model of information 
and consultation procedures, and can also act as a benchmark to assess Australian 
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information and consultation procedures19. Australia has adopted processes for consultation 
of employees in relation to technological change, redundancy, productivity and efficiency in 
awards or legislation. Yet as we have shown there are deficiencies in these processes which 
have meant that they have fallen short of the good practice criteria.  
 
The provision of consultation processes in Australia has also been affected by other serious 
problems which have undermined the development of good work practices. This includes the 
decline in union representation. Traditionally employees have been represented by trade 
unions in Australia but there has been a significant decline in union membership in recent 
years. Trade union membership declined from 51.1 per cent in 1976 to less than 25 per cent 
of the overall workforce in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2001), and declined 
further in 2003 to 23 per cent (with only 17.7 per cent in the private sector) (ABS, 2004). 
Thus, a substantial proportion of the workforce is not directly represented in the Australian 
workplace.  It could be argued that Australian trade unions continue to perform a key labour 
market function through their role in bargaining, and the creation and enforcement of awards, 
contributing to determination of working conditions that apply to many Australian workers, 
irrespective of whether they are trade union members. Nonetheless, their role in relation to 
awards has become more limited in recent years; awards only provide a safety net and are 
confined to the 20 allowable matters (WRA s 89A). These matters only touch upon the 
information and consultation of employees to a limited extent. Thus, the decline of union 
representation poses a serious problem for the development of co-operative workplace 
relations in Australia.  
 
Like unions, additional forms of employee information and consultation have an important 
role to play in the Australian industrial relations context. Some Australian companies have 
retained schemes of employee representation to achieve higher levels of productivity and 
performance, but empirical studies of workplace relations indicate that the level of joint 
decision-making in Australia is relatively underdeveloped (Morehead, et al, 1997). A recent 
review of joint consultation committees in federal certified agreements catalogued the 
problems pertaining to the features or characteristics of these bodies. The characteristics 
                                                 
19 It is noteworthy that many European countries have developed more extensive participation obligations. For 
instance, in Germany and the Netherlands works councils have certain rights to make joint decisions with 
management. For present purposes we support the minimum standards developed at the European level. Once 
minimum standards are accepted in Australia, it may be that higher standards would be developed in the future. 
Invariably, these standards are a product of compromise between the various views of different industrial 
parties. 
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included the composition of the committee, mode of appointment, frequency of meetings, 
topics discussed and powers of the committee. It is apparent that these features differ 
markedly from one committee to another, lack clarity in terms of the obligations expected of 
the parties, and fail to meet a range of the good practice criteria outlined in this paper. 
(Korman,S; JCC 2004).20 Furthermore, the lack of readily defined collective structures in 
non-unionised workplaces can mean that greater reliance is placed on management's ability to 
implement processes of change. This in turn may involve a considerable investment of 
management time and resources.  
 
The absence of employee input into Australian corporate decision-making can be contrasted 
unfavourably with the superior representation and involvement of employees in Europe 
(Campling and Gollan, 1999: ch.7). These findings, together with the decline in union 
membership, have led to the development of the concept of an Australian employee 
‘representation gap’. One consequence of such a gap is obviously that employee voices are 
not heard. Another is that workplace-specific decisions are increasingly left to be dealt with 
by employers and managers. As we have commented above, this can lead to increased costs 
for management in consulting the workforce.  
 
The Government could both assist these enterprises and address the perceived representation 
gap, by providing a legislative framework for employee information and consultation in 
Australia. The European experience with methods of consultation in the workplace does 
provide a useful model for the development of new methods of employee representation in 
Australia (Gollan and Patmore, 2003; Gollan, Markey and Ross, 2001). The Government 
could supplement the existing methods of workplace representation and negotiation in the 
WRA by providing for employers and employees to form ongoing joint consultative 
committees based on a legislative model that draws on the NDIC and EWCD. Such a model 
would be consistent with recent policy of the Australian Government to have workplace 
conditions determined as far as possible at the level of the workplace, and to involve 
employees in determining workplace conditions. 
 
                                                 
20 See Wage Net, last accessed 8 June 2005 at 
<http://www.wagenet.gov.au/WageNet/Search/Search.asp?Render=All>. These industries were chosen from the 
industry classifications provided by the Federal Government on its Wagenet database. 
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It is important to emphasise the key conceptual difference that would underlie such a scheme. 
Drawing on the European experience would mean emphasising the importance of the 
provision of information, and consultation, quite separately from traditional collective 
bargaining, but in a way that is complementary to it. Such a scheme could be implemented in 
a way that would also complement both employee representation at the workplace through 
unions, and the individualised arrangements promoted by the current federal Government 
(Gollan and Hamberger, 2002). This would represent a significant development in Australia, 
where employee participation (through information and consultation) has generally been seen 
as an adjunct to the award process or to collective bargaining, or alternatively, as simply 
unnecessary.   
 
Another key element of the European experience with workplace consultation is that it 
typically excludes pay from the topics for discussion within information and consultation 
committees (although where there is no union in the workplace, such committees in some 
countries may negotiate collective agreements). The removal of the key item of workplace 
conflict from the industrial equation assists as an incentive to begin dialogue, in an 
atmosphere that can become highly conducive to co-operative workplace relationships.   
 
At the outset, the government could trial and promote a voluntary legislative scheme, or 
encourage participation in other ways, including tax breaks, or the introduction of a reporting 
requirement. If the scheme were to be voluntary, it would be hard to see any sustained 
opposition by employer groups, especially as there is support from all parts of the political 
spectrum for the development of such schemes of employee representation (Gollan and 
Hamberger, 2002; Combet, 2001). At the same time, however, it appears that a legislative 
framework would ultimately be required; the voluntary approach of leaving it to employers 
and employees to develop their own arrangements has not redressed the lack of clarity and 
current low levels of joint consultation in Australia. 
 
To conclude, we believe that the Australian government should enact a new information and 
consultation procedure which would be in addition to the current federal enterprise 
bargaining process. The key features of the framework, such as topics to be discussed, the 
powers and composition of the committee, and mode of appointment of employee 
representatives, could draw upon the provisions of the NDIC and EWCD as well as good 
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practice in Australia and Europe. To establish such a legislative framework we believe that it 
would be necessary to amend the WRA. 
 
Amending the WRA 
If the government were to introduce a legislative model it would be necessary to amend the 
WRA. We now consider how the EU partnership model might be fashioned to existing 
Australian legislative arrangements through changes to the awards system, enterprise 
bargaining, and Australian Workplace Agreements.21  Finally, we briefly revisit what would 
be constitutionally possible and how such a law would mesh with state laws.  
 
As we have shown, it would be constitutionally possible to enact a legislative model of 
employee participation based upon the federal Corporations and Labour Powers.   These 
powers provide fertile ground for the development of an Australian scheme which would 
operate in a similar manner to the EWCD and the NDIC.  Should there be a conflict between 
the federal and state models, the federal law would prevail to the extent of inconsistency with 
the State law (Australian Constitution, s 109). However, as there is currently an absence of a 
general right for information and consultation at the state level it is unlikely that an 
inconsistency would arise. Thus a federal information and consultation committee could 
operate consistently with both Federal and State industrial relations laws. Alternatively the 
establishment of a Federal model may inspire state governments to develop their own new 
schemes of employee representation. This is to be welcomed given the limitations on the 
federal parliament’s power to enact industrial relations laws. Such schemes could operate 
under state law in areas that cannot be regulated by the Australian parliament because of 
constitutional limitations on its powers.  
 
Awards 
To introduce partnership arrangements into awards it would be necessary to amend the WRA, 
given that such arrangements are not regarded as being allowable award matters (WRA 
                                                 
21 The following description of amending the WRA draws from a helpful lecture by Colin Fenwick, Labour 
Relations Law, Melbourne Law School, December 2002. 
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 s 89A).22   While the Parliament can provide or withdraw legislative support for terms and 
conditions of employment it cannot directly regulate the conditions of employment in an 
award (Re Pacific Coal: Gleeson CJ: 359; Gummow and Hayne JJ: 418; Callinan J: 450) as 
the process of conciliation and arbitration must be recognisable as such (Re Pacific Coal, 
Kirby J: 437)  Thus, the specifics of the terms and conditions of a standard information and 
consultation clause would have to be determined by the Commission acting as an 
independent body settling an industrial dispute in the public interest  (Crichton & Stewart, 
2000: 66)   
 
The Parliament could also encourage the parties (unions and employer organisations) who are 
engaged in an industrial dispute to agree on a standard information and consultation clause to 
be inserted into awards, subject to the Commission’s approval. Because of the wording of the 
Federal Labour power, the Commission would have to either order conciliation or arbitrate 
the dispute in a test case (Crichton & Stewart, 2000: 68). Crichton & Stewart note that “it 
would appear that any system which facilitates private dispute resolution by recognising and 
enforcing collectively or individually negotiated agreements may only be validly enacted in 
reliance upon the industrial power if the disputes in question are otherwise subject to 
conciliation and arbitration” (Crichton & Stewart, 2000: 68). 
 
In addition, the government could encourage the parties to give effect to their agreements by 
asking the Commission to give consent awards under s 111(1)(b) of the WRA. While this is a 
rarely used provision it might provide a means for encouraging voluntary agreements.23 
Employers and unions could also engage in over-award bargaining to create their own 
information and consultation procedures without any amendment to the WRA, but such an 
agreement would be unenforceable. Moreover, the Commission has emphasised that 
enterprise agreements are best made through certified agreements under Part VIB of the 
WRA.  
 
                                                 
22 As discussed the AIRC deleted the general information procedures inserted by the TCR Case into awards 
because they did not fall within the scope of allowable award matters (WRA s 89A). 
23 The commission prefers certified agreements because Part VIB was purposely put into the WRA to facilitate 
the making and certifying of agreements and provides a more appropriate approach than the making of consent 
awards, which are intended to settle industrial disputes. See Review of Wage Fixing Principles 1994: 153-5; Re 
Review of Wage Fixing Principles 1993: 302-6. 
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Enterprise bargaining and certified agreements  
Enterprise bargaining provides a process by which a standard information and consultation 
procedure could be introduced into Australian workplaces.  Such a procedure could be 
established through an agreement without legislative amendment, the agreement could be 
unregistered (which may not be enforceable) (Ryan v TCFUA [1996] 2 VR 235) or it could be 
certified as either a Corporations agreement (WRA Part VIB Division 2 ss 170LO & 170LP) 
or a Disputes agreement (WRA Division 3, s 170LK). Disputes agreements are between a 
union and an employer and are supported by the Federal labour power (WRA ss 170LO & 
170LP).  Corporate agreements may be made with either a union (WRA ss 170LJ &170LL) or 
directly with a valid majority of employees (WRA s 170LK), and are supported by the Federal 
Corporations power. The parties are bound by a certified agreement in most circumstances 
(Generally WRA Div. 6 of Part VIB).  
 
The scope of certified agreements are defined by the WRA. Partnership arrangements would 
fall within the statutory definition of such an agreement, which refers to “matters pertaining 
to the relationship between [the employer] and all persons . . . whose employment is subject 
to the agreement’ (WRA s 170LI).  Despite the recent High Court decision in Electrolux 
Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union (Electrolux), which more restrictively 
interpreted these words, it is hard to argue that this interpretation should exclude the 
establishment of information and consultation procedures because these so obviously pertain 
to the subject matter of the relationship between “employers and employees in their capacity 
as such” and employment agreements under the Act (Electrolux: Gleeson CJ: 54; McHugh J 
66; Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ: 91). 
 
Moreover, federal regulation of certified agreements facilitates the voluntarist approach of 
allowing the establishment of employee participation schemes in Australian enterprises. If the 
federal parliament is to introduce a legislative scheme of information and consultation into 
certified agreements it would be necessary to amend the WRA. The federal parliament could 
specify the employment conditions for information and consultation to be established under 
Corporate Agreements. Under the corporations power the federal parliament can directly 
regulate the conditions of employment in a certified agreement; and is not restricted in the 
kind of legislation it can enact as it is under the awards system.   
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It is also important to note that the restrictive interpretation from the Electrolux decision is 
not an obstacle to the introduction of a legislative model because their Honours’ reasoning is 
based on statutory interpretation and not on constitutional limitations on Federal powers 
(Electrolux: Gleeson CJ: 53-54; McHugh J: 71-72; Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ: 92). 
  
Australian Workplace Agreements 
A third method for introducing information and consultation procedures into Australian 
enterprises would be to include them in an Australian Workplace Agreement (AWA). These 
are not contracts of employment (WRA s 170VF(2), Fenwick, 2002), but are agreements 
negotiated between an individual employee and an employer, which are supported by 
regulation under a federal power such as the Corporations power of  the Australian 
Constitution (WRA s 170VC). Information and consultation committees under an AWA can 
be formed without legislative amendment of the WRA. This is because AWAs cover matters 
that pertain to the relationship of employer and employee (WRA s 170VF(1)). The restriction 
of allowable matters under the awards system does not apply to the making of an AWA.  
 
To create a legislative model of an information and consultation procedure in an AWA, it 
would be necessary to amend the WRA. There would be no legal barrier to the creation of 
such a model since provisions already exist stipulating that certain conditions must be 
specified in AWAs, such as a prohibition against discrimination (WRA s 170VG(1)), and 
resolution of disputes (WRA s 170VG(3)).   
 
The model for an information and consultation procedure to be incorporated into either an 
AWA or certified agreement could be comprehensively specified in an appendix to the WRA. 
This would mean some provisions of the WRA would become unnecessary and could be 
repealed. For instance, the redundancy provisions of the WRA could be removed because they 
would be replaced by a more effective information and consultation procedure. Alternatively, 
a model could be integrated throughout the WRA’s provisions by amending specific 
provisions in the legislation. For example, the freedom of association provisions of the WRA 
could be amended to provide formal legal protection for employee representatives from any 
form of victimisation or discrimination and to provide protection to employers for their 
confidential information (Gollan and Hamberger, 2002: 35).  
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Thought would need to be given to how the procedural operation of a proposed information 
and consultation committee could be streamlined. For instance, would the committee be a 
party to the certification of an enterprise agreement, or would it be consulted in the drafting 
of an AWA. Hence, some procedural steps for a certified agreement under s 170LK of the 
WRA could be eliminated (Gollan and Hamberger, 2002: 35). Some changes could be made 
to the commencement date of AWAs and the cooling-off period (Gollan and Hamberger, 
2002: 35).  
 
In summary, the government’s voluntary approach is supported by the current provisions of 
the WRA particularly in relation to enterprise bargaining. If the government were to introduce 
a legislative model it would be necessary to amend the WRA. Such a model could be 
introduced through the processes of creating awards, certifying agreements and negotiating 
AWAs. Yet each of these options provides a means to create a legislative model of employee 
representation.  
 
The Effectiveness of a Legislative Model  
 
While it is clearly possible to amend the WRA to introduce a legally mandated scheme of 
employee participation it is necessary to consider the likely success of such a model. We now 
consider the effectiveness of creating such a model by exploring the application of EU laws 
in the Australian context. While there is wide-spread agreement that labour laws can be 
transferred from one legal system to another, opinions differ over the effectiveness of the 
transferability of such laws.  
 
One useful approach in assessing the effectiveness of such a transfer has been developed by 
Gunther Teubner (Teubner, 1998: 17–27). He argues that the transferability of a foreign law 
depends upon the extent of the connection with other social processes such as the political, 
cultural and economic (Forsyth, 2005; Teubner, 1998: 19)24.  According to Teubner, where 
the foreign law is “loosely coupled” with other social systems, the transfer is easier (Teubner, 
1998: 19). However, resistance to transferability is higher where the law is “tightly coupled” 
or closely connected to other social processes. (Teubner,1998: 19).  Where the law does not 
have the same level of connection in the recipient country it will become an “irritant in the 
new setting” (Forsyth, 2005; See Teubner 1998). 
                                                 
24 The description of Teubner's approach draws upon a helpful lecture by Anthony Forsyth, 2005. 
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We now apply Teubner’s approach to assess the effectiveness of the transferability of the EU 
social partnership model to Australia. We therefore consider the degree of connection 
between the EU directives and the economic and industrial relations systems in Australia and 
Europe, and we highlight some key differences and similarities.  
 
In our study we note that there are important differences between different European 
countries which will affect their usefulness as a comparator model for Australia. While works 
councils are well established institutions in Germany and the Netherlands, these institutions 
have only been recently introduced into the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is a 
useful comparator for Australia as it is a common law country, with an adversarial industrial 
relations system and has been influenced by similar neo-liberal political policies.  
 
Changing the Workplace Culture 
A critical issue in the transferability of foreign laws is whether or not they can create 
effective changes in work culture. Partnership arrangements have been criticised as 
ineffective on the basis that they are both unclear and misleading.  
 
Partnership lacks clarity 
The transferability of these European-style laws will depend upon the clarity of social 
partnership arrangements. Partnership has been criticised as a confusing idea because it offers 
little in the way of direction. Debates have raged in the United Kingdom over the meaning of 
partnership, which has been described as ‘all things to all people’ (Hyman, 1997; Kelly, 
1998; Kelly, 1999). There are a number of competing definitions. In the United Kingdom, it 
has been suggested that this lack of clarity is an obstacle in the dissemination and 
implementation of ideas of partnership (Involvement and Participation Association (IPA), 
2002). However, the European model of social partnership is not a term without content. In 
our view this model is grounded in specific laws and directives, which provide coherence and 
definition to the concept in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.   
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Partnership is misleading 
 
Another criticism made of the ‘partnership’ idea is that it is misleading, and creates a false 
impression that there is an equality of bargaining power between employers and employees 
(Christodoulou, 2001; Glasbeek, 2002). It is further argued that even though it may be 
possible for the idea of partnership to be given more substantive meaning, without equal 
bargaining power it will not be possible to actually achieve a non-adversarial model of 
workplace democracy as is presupposed by partnership. Glasbeek argues that the law of 
employment can reinforce the inequality between employees and employers. The law clearly 
states that workers are not employers’ partners, and are instead legally subordinate to 
employers. That which the employees sell – their bodies, intellect, skill etc. – are subjugated 
to the dictates of the employer. This creates a fundamental conflict between employees and 
employers such that the employment relationship is not treated as a partnership by law and 
cannot be a partnership in fact, no matter how co-operative employers and employees become 
within existing structures.  
 
In our view, the mere idea of partnership may not be sufficient to change social 
consciousness and work practices. However, the EU directives outlined in this article usher in 
new legal arrangements, creating new legal rights and entitlements for employees and 
obligations on employers. They thus serve as a power-balancing function, seeking to redress 
some of the inequalities in the employment relationship that have been criticised. Moreover, 
the word ‘social’ qualifies the word ‘partnership’, and contributes to creating a new form of 
industrial consciousness.  
 
Free market versus social market economies  
One question is whether or not the creation of a general right to information and consultation 
under European law can only operate effectively in Europe but not in the Australian 
economy. It is important to consider the different types of economic systems and the nature 
of corporate governance in the different economies. It is argued that information and 
consultation arrangements along the lines of the EWCD and NDIC are incompatible with 
Australia’s free market economy as opposed to the European social markets (Cameron, 
2001). The legal regulation of corporate governance is apparently different in each 
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jurisdiction (Forsyth, 2005). Companies are quasi public bodies that recognise stakeholder 
interests, including employees in continental corporations (Forsyth, 2005). Works councils do 
participate in the appointment of employee representatives on company boards in some 
European countries (See for example, the Civil Code of The Netherlands).  
 
The legal regulation of corporate governance in Australia is based on a shareholder centred 
model. As a general rule employees do not have representation on company boards. 
However, as Forsyth mentions there have been shifts in Australian corporate governance that 
may be of benefit to employee interests. Changes to corporate law in the wake of company 
collapses have attempted to protect workers’ entitlements over the last few years (Forsyth; 
2005; See for example Corporations Law Amendment (employee entitlements) Act 2000 
(Cth)). However in our view, the arguments over the obstacles created by different legal 
regulations of corporate governance are somewhat misconceived. The legal obligations 
created by the NDIC and the EWCD do not operate at the level of board management. Rather 
they operate at the level of the employment relationship. Therefore, the European partnership 
model as contained in EU directives can operate effectively regardless of which approach to 
corporate governance is adopted. While a shareholder primacy approach in relation to 
corporate governance continues to operate, it should not be a significant barrier to the 
introduction of an effective European style information and consultation system in Australia.  
 
Workplace co-operation and conflict 
A critical issue that arises in relation to the transferability of employment law is how 
effectively the law regulates workplace co-operation and conflict. It has been argued that EU 
partnership arrangements are incompatible with Australia’s system of conflictual negotiations 
over wages and conditions (Cameron, 2001). We argue, however, that this view is incorrect 
because it fails to properly consider the potential of the co-operative elements of Australia’s 
industrial relations system. The Australian system is not solely a conflictual system. While 
conflictual industrial relations are a significant part of the system, the system does not per se 
exclude co-operative work arrangements. Indeed these are an important part of the system 
too. Co-operative workplace arrangements exist in the form of conflict resolution through the 
process of conciliation and arbitration at the federal and state levels (Forsyth, 2005).  As we 
have shown, Australia has developed systems of co-operative industrial relations in the past. 
Institutions for developing economic and labour policy in the form of the Accord were 
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created at the national level of government, and institutions such as joint consultative 
committees and consultation over redundancies have been created at the company level 
(Forsyth, 2005). Therefore the Australian industrial relations system can in fact accommodate 
co-operative workplace arrangements which might include new employee rights to 
information and consultation in the workplace.    
 
It has also been argued that the Australian process of conflictual collective bargaining could 
“taint” the proposed consultative procedures, which would also operate at the level of the 
enterprise (Forsyth, 2005). The European social partnership model avoids this problem by 
separating worker representation functions, allowing unions to conduct collective bargaining, 
and creating separate bodies such as works councils through which consultation occurs 
(Forsyth, 2005). Importantly, the European social partnership model removes the contentious 
issue of pay.  
 
One assumption of the critics’ view of the European social partnership model, is that it is 
founded upon a co-operative workplace relationship. In our view, the social partnership 
model may have a range of consequences for the management of co-operation and conflict in 
industrial relations. One plausible view is that the social partnership models indeed can create 
a new form of employee cooperation, minimising industrial conflict.  In the United Kingdom, 
it has been suggested that ‘social partnership’ is based on a series of general principles: ‘a 
joint commitment to the success of the enterprise, to building trust and mutual recognition of 
the legitimate role of employer and employee representatives’ (IPA, 1992). This partnership 
model is said to replace an environment of adversarial bargaining and reactive conflict for 
consultation and co-operation, based on models developed in Germany25 and Scandinavian 
countries (Ackers, et al, 2002; Gospel and Willman, 2002).  
 
An alternative view is that the social partnership model may cohabit with conflictual models 
of industrial relations. It is argued that partnership does not erode the potential conflict that 
may exist between employers and employees over wages and conditions mediated through 
collective bargaining. For instance, the EWCD does not deal with the traditional function of 
collective bargaining.  In this context ‘social partnership may offer a new vision of the place 
                                                 
25 Germany has multi-channel representation – collective bargaining outside the firm and legally-based joint 
consultation at the workplace and enterprise level, along with employee representation on the supervisory board 
of companies (Gospel and Willman, 2002). 
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of unions in participation arrangements’, by engaging in new co-operative work arrangements 
and still continuing their function to engage in conflictual collective bargaining.  
 
It must also be acknowledged that under this model ‘a variety of outcomes are possible, 
ranging from compatibility or indeed synergy, through to tension and competition between 
management and union representatives to secure influence’ (Ackers, et al, 2002). In 
summary, in our view information and consultation procedures introduce a process of social 
dialogue which foster co-operative tendencies, but allow for a range of co-operative and 
conflictual responses in the workplace.  
 
Social partners 
The management of workplace conflict and co-operation will affect the interest of employers 
and unions in more specific ways. Both employers and employees are regarded as social 
partners, and the extent to which they are willing to take on these roles will depend on how 
the information and consultation procedures affect their interests. Partnership aims to 
minimise the costs and maximise the benefits for both parties. Employers can seek co-
operation in maximising efficiency and flexibility, whilst employees can seek greater job 
security. Partnership arrangements are meant to assure unions that they will not be 
marginalised from workplaces and instil confidence in employers that they will be able to 
manage their business effectively. We now consider the implications of the partnership model 
for Australian managers and unions in more depth.  
 
Implications for Trade Unions 
In recent years there has been a debate within the Australian union movement over whether 
unions should support the introduction of new forms of employee representation. There 
seems to be a gradual shift in favour of supporting these new structures. Interestingly, a 
similar shift in support by trade unions for such mechanisms occurred in the United 
Kingdom. The UK peak union body, the Trade Union Council, now advocates partnership 
arrangements.26 While advocates in Australia may not see the introduction of alternative 
consultation arrangements as a means to significantly redress the decline in Union 
membership (Forsyth, 2005) they see other important benefits of such mechanisms. As Greg 
                                                 
26 http://www.tuc.org.uk/partnership/index.cfm 
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Combet points out, the topics for discussion by European-style works councils highlight the 
deprivation of entitlements of Australian employees. As he notes, Australia is now decades 
behind EU developments in consultation rights (Combett, 2001).  His support for such 
structures is not unqualified. As Combett warns, he would not support structures that negate, 
undermine or diminish the ability of unions to organise, represent and collectively bargain on 
behalf of their members (Combett, 2001). 
 
Some unionists in Australia may fear that such mechanisms might potentially marginalise 
unions, ‘threatening their traditional role of defending and advancing worker rights’ (Ackers, 
et al, 2002: 4). Kelly argues that employee involvement based on the creation of consultative 
arrangements, such as works councils, means that employers can secure workforce consent to 
corporate goals such as profit maximisation and cost reduction without consultations with a 
trade union (Kelly, 1999).  
 
However, it is argued that such a view is not applicable to the European social partnership 
model because unions are regarded as social partners who would be expected to participate in 
works council deliberations.  The European (and EU) concept of social partnership is based 
on social dialogue between employers and employees, through representative bodies, notably 
trade unions and works councils (Ackers, et al, 2002). For instance the EWCD combines both 
of these ideas by envisaging a role for unions as employee representatives on works councils.  
 
However, the way in which unions are to perform these functions is not straight forward. This 
is because selection of employee representatives under the EWCD and NDIC may be either 
by election or appointment. The provision of alternative procedures for appointments 
(appointment or election) under the EU directives was designed to allow for appointments 
based on union membership in some European countries. However, in the UK the EWCD and 
NDIC do not provide any automatic participatory rights for union representatives who must 
stand for election alongside other non-union representatives. Potentially, such arrangements 
may operate with, against, or in the absence of union structures (Gollan, 2003b). Nonetheless, 
the use of the Directives to exclude unions is blunted because there is no prohibition on union 
members standing for election. In the UK and Australia, unions may be seen to be in an 
advantageous position, because they are most likely to be able to find people to act as 
employee representatives. If Australia adopts the social partnership model it is not likely to 
undermine the activities of trade unions.   
42 
 
Trade unionists are well placed to act as information and consultative representatives in 
Australia. While they may need some training to be effective employee information and 
consultation representatives it is also likely that they will be well placed to perform this 
function based on the experience they have gained through their collective bargaining 
activities. They would be familiar with some of the processes associated with works councils 
such as negotiations over contractual relations and discussion of changes in workplace 
organisation, and would be familiar with electoral processes. 
 
Finally, unions should be comforted by Kelly’s suggestion that the ‘power resources wielded 
by workers, through unions and works councils, mean that ‘social partnership’ may involve a 
mutual accommodation of interests rather than an imposition of the employers’ interests’ 
(Kelly, 1999: 3). 
 
Implications for management 
 
Cameron argues that the current attitudes and cultures of employers in Australia stand as a 
major barrier to the establishment of effective representative works councils (Cameron, 
2001).  Opposition to such processes may arise because managers may fear that partnership 
arrangements will remove their ‘right to manage’ or their right to exercise their managerial 
prerogative. In our view this fear is misconceived. The framework of consultation does not 
remove managerial prerogative since the final decision rests with management. Alternatively, 
management may fear that employee information and consultation rights would restrict the 
exercise of managerial prerogative, that they will not be able to make prompt decisions, and 
that there will have to be an accommodation of interests between works councils 
representatives and managers. If a model based on the EU Directives was adopted in 
Australia the topics for consultation would need to be specified, curbing both the power of 
unions and managers. In our view the accommodation of interests strengthens rather than 
weakens management decision-making. Evidence from Europe suggests that the process of 
consultation does not cause undue delays in managerial decision-making and moreover 
consultation processes refine and reshape managerial decision-making.  
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To facilitate the process of consultation, social partnership is not only built on high trust, co-
operation and compromise, but as a basic assumption, it is built on ‘social relations’ between 
the employees through their representatives, employers and the state. This interaction shapes 
and influences their expectations and strategies in achieving their aims through the bargaining 
process (Frege, 2002).  
 
Significantly, this process has positive benefits for organisational outcomes and 
competitiveness (Collins, 2003.b: 2) Collins argues that EU regulation through social 
partnership initiatives support and encourage those types of employment relations which are 
highly productive (Collins.b, 2003: 5). In particular, he argues that partnership institutions 
‘provide an institutional framework for encouraging disclosure of information and 
collaboration between workers and management to direct the business towards the most 
profitable avenues’. Significantly, Collins goes on to suggest: 
 
These highly productive employment relationships are identified as using highly 
skilled workers, who co-operate together in a knowledge-based economy to create 
innovative products in highly efficient ways. Regulating for competitiveness 
involves the search for institutional frameworks that facilitate the development 
and stability of these flexible kinds of employment relations. [For example] The 
lack of employment security in businesses that are undergoing a continuous 
process of adaptation clearly creates the risk that employees will not co-operate 
with innovation and try to place obstructions in the way of business 
reorganisation. One way to counter this concern of the workforce is to ensure that 
they are informed at all times of business plans or work organisation plans, and 
that they are consulted about how best to handle change (Collins, 2003.b: 5-6). 
 
Collins also explains how the legal rules based on partnerships create high trust relationships 
leading to competitive economic outcomes: 
 
Effective co-operation requires … the building of trust and the disclosure of 
information on both sides, and partnership institutions can contribute to this 
goal. Competitiveness also supports legal rules that build trust between the 
parties in other ways, so that they will be willing to accept flexibility in the terms 
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of the arrangement in return for the safeguards provided or induced by the law 
(Collins. 2003b: 5). 
 
The EU information and consultation directives are also regarded as a vital and positive 
response to the economic effects of globalisation. The directives are based on the principle 
that employers and employees should take the lead in modernising the workplace and the 
workforce. The EU’s representative consultative arrangements represent a non-protectionist 
response to intensified international competition, seeking to enhance the performance of 
firms through improved co-operation between employees and management, and permitting 
continuous restructuring of the production process (Muller-Jentsch, 1995: 346 fn 20). 
 
In discussing the EWCD, Padraig Flynn, the former European Commissioner with 
responsibility for Employment and Social Affairs, drew two conclusions from European 
experience regarding the process of restructuring: 
 
[First,] that constant industrial change and corporate restructuring is an inevitable 
part of remaining competitive in the world. The second is that, if this constant 
industrial change and corporate restructuring is to meet its objective — if it is to be 
a positive factor in our competitiveness — then it needs to engage the workforce, as 
an integral and as a formal part of that process (Flynn, 1999). 
 
It could be argued that like Europe, Australian firms are subject to the economic forces of 
globalisation and the need to remain competitive. Hence, partnership arrangements seem to 
offer significant potential for improving economic performance of Australian firms too.  
 
Implications for the government  
 
Governments also have a role to play in promoting partnership arrangements. Critics of 
partnership arrangements argue that the current government’s attitudes are opposed to the 
establishment of effective representative works councils (Cameron, 2001). It is also noted 
that the role that unions should play is contested in Australian society (Forsyth, 2005). The 
critics’ argument seems to assume that the attitudes of governments in Australia are 
immutable and unchanging. However, previous Australian governments have promoted more 
consultative industrial relations such as the Accord. In fact, EU partnerships based on the 
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directives are designed to change and improve information and consultation procedures, and 
have done so in many cases.   
 
Governments in Australia may find promotion of consultation at work attractive for many 
reasons.  New forms of employee representation could harness the strength of employee 
knowledge and involvement to also help Australia confront important socio-economic 
problems. By creating a legislative model for information and consultation mechanisms, the 
Government could work to address key labour market problems by setting the agenda at a 
national (macro) level, while allowing implementation that best suits workers and managers 
at the enterprise (micro) level.  
 
It could do so by establishing the key topics for discussion within information and 
consultation committees so as to address fundamental economic problems. These could 
include: 
• Employability and skills training – to help manage the chronic skills shortages facing 
Australia; 
• Finding better ways to integrate casual and permanent employees;  
• Introduction of technological change – to enhance productivity; 
• Managing acquisitions, mergers and redundancies – to better address the issue of job 
security; 
• Discussing working hours – as a means of managing the work-life balance; and 
• Considering flexible work practices to enhance efficient work outcomes. 
 
The list of topics need only be framed in very general terms. Consistent with recent 
government policy, such a policy would not direct employers and employees as to outcomes. 
Rather, it would bring the parties together to discuss critical labour market problems, to find 
innovative solutions to suit each enterprise.  
 
The logic of partnership arrangements provides guidance for their adoption. Working with 
others for the achievement of common purposes needs to be promoted at all levels. A 
legislative model establishing information and consultation procedures for Australia could be 
introduced therefore by the Australian government sitting down with peak, union, and 
employer organisations. This process would enable the expertise of all the organisations to 
46 
contribute to developing a model which would effectively operate in the Australian labour 
market. A similar process was embarked upon by the UK Government in drafting the 
regulations for the introduction of the NDIC (Hewitt, 2003: Preface, DTI). As Patricia Hewitt 
explains, this was the first time the UK government had discussed the implementation of the 
European social legislation with peak employment bodies and it regarded the process as an 
‘interesting and successful experience’ (Hewitt, 2003: Preface, DTI,).  Given the experience 
of the Hawke government of consulting peak bodies, it is likely that the development of these 
kinds of partnership arrangements could be successfully introduced in Australia.  
 
To evaluate the likely success of the adoption of EU partnership laws and arrangements in 
Australia, it is necessary to assess the similarities and differences in the operation of the IR 
and economic systems in each jurisdiction (Forsyth, 2005; Teubner, 1998). Australia’s 
conflictual industrial relations systems may be a significant difference to the systems in some 
EU countries. The difference in corporate governance in Australia and Europe may not be a 
significant barrier since EU information and consultation directives do not operate at this 
level; rather they regulate employment relationships. Despite these differences there are 
important similarities which bode well for the adoption of such partnership arrangements in 
Australia. Firms in both Europe and Australia are both subject to the same economic 
pressures of globalisation and competitiveness. Trade unions have begun to look more 
favourably on the need to improve consultation rights, and Australian labour laws have 
continued to foster some limited but important consultative arrangements.  
 
Conclusion  
 
While the current focus on enterprise bargaining in the workplace might encourage us to 
think about new information and consultation mechanisms at work, there are no legislative 
provisions imminent. The voluntary approach has, however, failed to create a generally 
available right to information and consultation at work. We have reviewed European models 
of employee representation and consultation in the workplace with particular attention paid to 
the social partnership model of employee representation. We conclude that there are a 
number of lessons to be learnt from the European system of social partnership, and European 
experience suggests that these models may be useful in the Australian context.  
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However, it must be recognised that under the EU information and consultation directives, 
the new co-operative tendencies do not fully eliminate the adversarial and conflict element in 
organisations, but channel it instead. As such, the patterns of tensions have shifted due to the 
changing expectations of employees and the interpretation of these expectations by their 
representatives. Such structures of employee consultation and involvement enable employees 
and employers to assemble in politico-economic forums, within which more democratic 
access is granted. This enables a richer process of consultation and employee involvement 
with associated positive social and economic outcomes.  
 
It could be argued that increased support for these institutions is recognition that the creation 
of economic value is an essentially social process, and that organisational sustainability 
depends on legitimate social governance. As the above review demonstrates, perhaps 
employers, unions and governments should recognise that the time has come for new 
institutions to create a new type of participative, productive and democratic workplace in 
Australia. 
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